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1. Introduction
The BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard[1] has been known as a famous
protocol guaranteeing information theoretical security. Its security has been proved
by Mayers[2] in the single-photon case. However, implemented channels usually have
imperfect quantum state generators, which generate not a perfect single-photon but a
mixture of the vacuum state, the single-photon state, and the multi-photon state. In
fact, many implemented quantum communication systems are equipped with phase-
randomized weak coherent light, which can be regarded as the above type of mixed
state[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In order to guarantee the security in the above imperfect quantum
communication systems, Gottesman et al. (GLLP)[8], and Inamori et al. (ILM)[9]
have obtained a useful formula for the asymptotic key generation (AKG) rate, which
needs the counting rate and the phase error rate of single photon state. If we treat
the worst case of these parameters, the obtained AKG rate become worse. In order to
estimate these parameters properly, Hwang [10] proposed the decoy method, in which
we randomly choose different intensities of the coherent light. In the decoy method, a
pulse for final key generation is called the signal pulse while a pulse only for estimation
of these parameters is called a decoy pulse. When k intensities are choosed for decoy
pulses, we need to prepare k + 1 intensities. Therefore, as was pointed out by Lo et
al.[11], for the estimation of the counting rate of single photon state, we have to treat
an infinite number of the unknown parameters only with k + 1 equations even if the
counting rates of individual number states do not depend on the basis. (Note that the
counting rates for multi-photon states depend on the basis as well as the number of
photon. However, we consider this special case for simplicity in introduction.) In this
case, its estimate can be derived from the restriction for all unknown parameters. Hence,
lager number of intensities yields a more precise estimate of the counting rate of single
photon state. The phase error rate of single photon state has the same characterization.
In order to reduce the cost of its realization, Wang [12] proposed to choose the
minimum decoy intensity to be the vacuum. By using this idea, QKD system can be
implemented with k kinds of intensities essentially. In the following, we adopt this
assumption. In the case of k = 2, Wang [12] also proposed an expansion of the phase-
randomized coherent states
∑∞
n=0
e−µµn
n!
|n〉〈n|, which describe the signal pulse and the
decoy pulses. His expansion is different from the conventional expansion by number
states in that the signal and decoy states can be described by stochastic mixtures of
at most four states. Under his expansion, we obtain three constraint equations with
four unknown parameters. He derived an estimate of the counting rate of the single
photon state. Ma et al.[13] also derived the same estimate by a different method. Ma et
al.[13] and Wang [14] obtained an estimate of the phase error rate of the single photon
state, and completed the estimation of AKG rate in the case of k = 2, independently.
Ma et al.[13] pointed out that if the second smallest intensity goes to 0, the required
parameters can be solved perfectly. So, we obtain the best AKG rate, which is called the
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universal upper bound‡. However, as was mentioned by them, it is impossible to control
the infinitesimal intensity. Further, even if it is possible, if we choose small intensity,
we cannot estimate the required parameters properly because the infinitesimal intensity
makes our estimate fragile for statistical fluctuation. Thus, for a precise estimate, we
need to fix the minimum difference between two intensities. That is, it is suitable to
compare the qualities of our estimates by changing the number of decoy intensities under
this constraint. For a good survey, please see Wang [15].
Now, we trun to the improvement of AKG rate. After GLLP-ILM’s result, Lo[16]
conjectured an improvement of their AKG rate with a rough idea of its proof. Based
on his conjecture, Boileau-Batuwantudawe-Laflamme (BBL)[17] discussed a further
improvement of the rate by taking into account the effects of dark counts in the detector.
They pointed out that the AKG rate in the forward error correction case is different
with respect to that in the reverse case. In the following, these rates will be called
BBL formulas. Lo’s conjecture has been proved by Hayashi [22] and Koashi [18],
independently. Hence, it is suitable to apply these formulas to the decoy method.
In this paper, we treat the case of arbitrary number k of decoy intensities with BBL
formulas when the intensity can be controlled§. For this purpose, we generalize Wang’s
expansion of the phase-randomized coherent states, in which k + 1 phase-randomized
coherent states are given by convex combinations of k + 2 states, which are called basis
states. The idea of this generalization is trivial, however, it is not trivial to derive the
concrete forms of k + 2 basis states and to check their positivity. It is also needed to
give the AKG rate formula by using the counting rates and the phase error rates of each
intensities based on this expansion. For this purpose, we generalize mean value theorem
and the concept of “difference”. In the conventional mean value theorem, we treat the
derivative of a given function f and the difference between outcomes of the function f
in two points. In this paper, we extend the concept of “difference” to the case of n+ 1
points, and derive its formula based on the n-th derivative. We also derive a formula
for the generalized “difference”. Using these formulas, we give concrete forms of k + 2
basis states and showed their positivity. We also derive a formula for estimating the
counting rate and the phase error rate of the single photon state from the counting rates
and the phase error rates of signal and decoy state. Then, the AKG rate formulas with
BBL formulas are obtained. Moreover, we numerically compare the AKG rates of the
cases of k = 2, 3, 4 and the universal upper bound in a proper model. As our result, the
AKG rates of the case of k = 3 attain the universal upper bound within 1% error in
casein the forward and reverse error case. That is, further great improvement cannot
be expected even if the number k increases more than 3.
The organization of this paper is given as follows. Section 2 gives the AKG rates in
both the forward and reverse cases as conjectured by BBL[17], taking into account
‡ Indeed, if we use a good code instead of random coding, there is a possibility to improve this bound.
However, if we use random coding it is impossible to improve the universal upper bound.
§ For the case when the intensity fluctuates, see the papers [19, 20] and the back note [26] of the paper
[21].
General theory for decoy-state quantum key distribution 4
the effect of dark counts. In Section 3, we treat the universal upper bound in a
proper channel model. In Section 4, we review the results by Wang [12, 14], Ma et
al.[13]. In Section 5, we generalize Wang’s expansion of the phase-randomized coherent
state
∑∞
n=0
e−µµn
n!
|n〉〈n|. In Section 6, we give a lower bound of AKG rate based on
the counting rates and phase error rates of respective intensities. In Section 7, we
numerically compare the AKG rates in the case of k = 2, 3, 4 and its universal upper
bound. In Section 8, the generalized “difference” is introduced, and all theorems are
proved.
2. AKG rates with dark counts effect
When the transmitted pulse is given as a mixture of the vacuum, single-photon, and
multi-photon, taking into account the effect of dark counts in the detector, BBL[17]
conjectured the following AKG rate by use of Lo[16]’s conjecture, which is proved
by Koashi [18] and Hayashi [22] with the threshold detector independently. Further,
Hayashi [22] allows loss of detector if it is independent of the measurement basis. That
is, we assume the same receiver model as Hayashi [22]. Let q0 and q1 be the probabilities
detecting the the vacuum state and the single-photon state except for dark counts in
detector. Let µ be the intensity of the signal pulse, which produces the raw keys. Then,
We denote the dark count rate in the detector, the phase error rate concerning the
single-photon state counted except for dark counts, the bit error probability of signal
pulse, and the counting rate of signal pulse by pD, r
1, sµ, and pµ, respectively. When
we use the phase-randomized coherent light with the intensity µ, e−µ and µe−µ are the
probabilities generating the vacuum state and the single-photon state. In this case,
Eve has no information concerning Bob’s bit of the pulses detected by dark counts and
Alice’s bit of the pulses whose state is the vacuum state. Hence, the AKG rate with
the forward error correction is different from that with the reverse error correction, and
they are given as follows. (See BBL[17] or Section IV A of Hayashi[22].)
I→ :=
1
2
(
µe−µq1(1− h(r1)) + e−µ(q0 + pD)− pµη(sµ)
)
(1)
I← :=
1
2
(
µe−µq1(1− h(r1)) + pD − pµη(sµ)
)
, (2)
where η(s) is chosen so that 1− η(s) is the coding rate of the classical error correction
code and h(x) is given by
h(x) =
{
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) if x ≤
1
2
1 if x > 1
2
.
In the above formula, we regard the simultaneous event of a dark count and a normal
count as a dark count. This is because the collision of both photons disturbs the
information of the normal count.
These are the rates per one pulse sent by Alice. Thus, the coefficient 1
2
corresponds
to the probability that the basis of Alice coincides with that of Bob. For protocols
attaining these rates, see Hayashi [22].
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The dark count rate in the detector should be measured before the sending the
quantum communication. In the above formulas, the parameters q0, q1 and r1 are not
known a priori. These cannot be estimated if only the pulse with the intensity µ is
transmitted. In the decoy method [10], we randomly change the intensity µ and estimate
these parameters from the counting rates and error rates of individual intensities. In
particular, the parameter q0 can be estimated by the counting rate p0 of the vacuum
pulses so that we obtain q0 = p0 − pD. Once the parameter q
0 is fixed, both the AKG
rates I→ and I← are given as monotone increasing functions concerning q
1(1 − h(r1)).
Hence, the remaining problem is the estimation of the parameters q1 and r1, which is a
more complicated problem.
In order to calculate these parameters, we need simultaneous equations concerning
the individual intensities, in which the counting rates except for dark counts in detector
and error rates of individual number states are treated as the unknown parameters. For
simplicity, we assume that the counting rate except for dark counts in detector does
not depends on the basis. Then, we let q˜n be the counting rate of the state |n〉〈n|,
and r˜n be the error rate of the state |n〉〈n| with the × basis. Note that q˜1 = q1 and
r˜1 = r1. Letting pi be the counting rate of the intensity µi, and si be the error rate of
the intensity µi with the × basis, we obtain [11]
pi = e
−µi(p0 − pD) + e
−µi
∞∑
n=1
µni
n!
q˜n + pD (3)
sipi = e
−µi
1
2
(p0 − pD) + e
−µi
∞∑
n=1
µni
n!
r˜nq˜n +
1
2
pD (4)
for i = 1, . . . , k and
0 ≤ q˜n ≤ 1, 0 ≤ r˜n ≤ 1. (5)
That is, our task is to calculate the minimum value I(~p, ~s) of q1(1 − h(r1)) under the
conditions (3), (4), and 1− pD ≥ q˜
n ≥ 0, 1 ≥ r˜n ≥ 0, for given vectors ~p = (p1, . . . , pk)
and ~s = (s1, . . . , sk).
3. Universal upper bounds on concrete noise model
In a real optical communication system, when the intensity is µi the dark counts rate in
the optical fiber or the detector is p0, which is equal to the counting rate of the vacuum
pulse, the counting rate pi and the error rate si are given by
pi = pi+k = p(µi) := 1− e
−αµi + p0 (6)
si = si+k = s(µi) :=
s(1− e−αµi) + 1
2
p0
p(µi)
, (7)
where the parameter α is the counting rate of the single photon except for dark counts
in the the detector or interfusion on optical fiber, and the parameter s is the error rate
of single photon for normal detection. In an implemented channel, the parameter is
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given by the function of the length of transmittance L as
α = θ · 10−
a1L+a0
10 , (8)
where θ is the efficiency of the detector, a0 is loss coefficient in the detector, and a1 is
loss coefficient in the communication channel. When the detection probability of the
n-photon state is 1 − (1 − α)n + p0, the relation (6) holds. When the error probability
of the n-photon state is
s(1−(1−α)n)+ 1
2
p0
1−(1−α)n+p0
, the relation (7) holds. Hence, the quantities
q1 = α + p0 − pD and r
1 =
sα+ 1
2
(p0−pD)
α+p0−pD
satisfy the conditions (3) and (4). Thus, we
obtain
I(~p(~µ), ~s(~µ)) ≤ (α + (p0 − pD))(1− h(
sα + 1
2
(p0 − pD)
α + (p0 − pD)
)),
where ~p(~µ) = (p(µ1), . . . , p(µk)), ~s(~µ) = (s(µ1), . . . , s(µk)). Therefore, applying (1) and
(2), we obtain the following universal upper bounds of the AKG rates in the forward
and reverse cases:
I→(µ; p0, pD, α, s) :=
1
2
[
µe−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1− h(
sα + 1
2
(p0 − pD)
α + (p0 − pD)
))
+ e−µp0 − (1− e
−αµ + p0)η(
s(1− e−αµ) + 1
2
p0
1− e−αµ + p0
)
]
(9)
I←(µ; p0, pD, α, s) :=
1
2
[
µe−µ(α+ (p0 − pD))(1− h(
sα + 1
2
(p0 − pD)
α + (p0 − pD)
))
+ pD − (1− e
−αµ + p0)η(
s(1− e−αµ) + 1
2
p0
1− e−αµ + p0
)
]
, (10)
respectively.
When p0 = pD = 0, both rates are equal to
1
2
(µe−µα(1− h(s))− (1− e−αµ)h(s)),
which can be approximated by
1
2
(µe−µα(1− h(s))− (1− e−αµ)h(s)) ∼= α
µ(e−µ − (1 + e−µ)h(s))
2
(11)
when α is sufficiently small.
As is shown in Appendix C, the optimum intensity is characterized as
argmax
µ
I→(µ; p0, pD, α, s) ≤ 1 (12)
argmax
µ
I←(µ; p0, pDα, s) ≤ 1. (13)
If we choose intensities of decoy pulses suitably, the estimated parameters q1 and r1 are
close to α and s. Hence, it is suitable to choose the intensity of the phase-randomized
coherent light producing the raw keys among the interval [0, 1].
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4. Wang’s expansion
We review the previous results concerning the estimation of the parameters q1 and r1.
In this section, we consider only the case of pD = 0 because these results treated only
this case. In order to avoid infinite number of unknown parameters in (3), Wang [12]
proposed the following expansion of the states
∑∞
n=0 e
−µi µ
n
n!
|n〉〈n| in the case of k = 2:
∞∑
n=0
e−µ1
µn1
n!
|n〉〈n| = e−µ1 |0〉〈0|+ e−µ1µ1|1〉〈1|+ e
−µ1µ21Ω2ρ2 (14)
∞∑
n=0
e−µ2
µn2
n!
|n〉〈n| = e−µ2 |0〉〈0|+ e−µ2µ2|1〉〈1|+ e
−µ2µ22Ω2ρ2 + e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3ρ3,(15)
where
ρ2 :=
1
Ω2
∞∑
n=2
µn−21
n!
|n〉〈n|, (16)
ρ3 :=
1
Ω3
∞∑
n=3
µn−22 − µ
n−2
1
(µ2 − µ1)n!
|n〉〈n| (17)
Ω2 :=
1
µ21
(eµ1 − (1 + µ1)) (18)
Ω3 :=
1
µ22
(eµ2 − (1 + µ2 +
µ22
2
))−
1
µ21
(eµ1 − (1 + µ1 +
µ21
2
)). (19)
Based on this expansion, we define the parameters q2, q3, r2, and r3 as
qj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜n|n〉〈n| (20)
rjqj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜nr˜n|n〉〈n| (21)
for j = 2, 3. Then, we have the following equations instead of (3) and (5):
p1 = e
−µ1p0 + e
−µ1µ1q
1 + e−µ1µ21Ω2q
2 (22)
p2 = e
−µ2p0 + e
−µ2µ2q
1 + e−µ2µ22Ω2q
2 + e−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3q
3 (23)
0 ≤ qj ≤ 1 for j = 1, 2, 3. (24)
Wang [12] gave a lower bound of q2 in the following way. First, he calculated the
maximum value q2U of q
2 with the conditions (22), (23), and q1, q3 ≥ 0:
q2U =
p1
Ω2
(
1
µ2 − µ1
(
e−µ1p2
µ2e−µ2p1
−
1
µ1
) +
e−µ1p0
µ2p1
)
Using (22), he essentially obtained a lower bound q2,min of q
1:
q2,min :=
µ2e
µ1
µ1(µ2 − µ1)
(p1 − e
−µ1p0)−
µ1e
µ2
µ2(µ2 − µ1)
(p2 − e
−µ2p0).
Wang [14] also obtained an upper bound b1,max of q
1r1
b1,max :=
s1p1e
µ1 − 1
2
p0
µ1
.
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On the other hand, Ma et al. [13] treated the case where only two kinds of intensities
are used for estimation of q1 and r1. Their results can be translated into our case of
k = 3 by putting the counting rate p0 of the vacuum pulse into the parameter q
0.
Assume that µ1 + µ2 < µ3, µ1 + µ2 < 1, and µ1 < µ2 < µ3. Then, they obtained an
lower bound of q1:
q1 ≥ q1,3L :=
µ3(p2e
µ2 − p1e
µ1 −
µ22−µ
2
1
µ23
(p3e
µ3 − p0))
µ2µ3 − µ3µ1 − µ22 + µ
2
1
, (25)
and an upper bound of q1r1:
q1r1 ≤ b1,2U :=
s2p2e
µ2 − s1p1e
µ1
µ2 − µ1
. (26)
Taking the limit µ1 → 0, they obtained the the lower bound q2,min of q
1 in the case of
k = 2. Also, similarly, they independently obtain the upper bound b1,max of q
1r1.
Consider how tight the bounds q2,min and b1,max are. As will be mentioned in
Theorem 2, the minimum value of q1 under the conditions (22), (23) and 1 ≥ q2, q3 ≥ 0
is calculated as
q1,2min = max{q2,min, q1,min},
where
q1,min :=
eµ1
µ1
(p1 − e
−µ1p0)− e
−µ1µ21Ω2.
Similar to (22) and (23), instead of (4), the relations
s1p1 = e
−µ1
p0
2
+ e−µ1µ1q
1r1 + e−µ1µ21Ω2q
2r2 (27)
s2p2 = e
−µ2
p0
2
+ e−µ2µ2q
1r1 + e−µ2µ22Ω2q
2r2 + e−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3q
3r3 (28)
0 ≤ qjrj ≤ 1 for j = 1, 2, 3 (29)
hold. Then, the maximum value b1,2max of q
1r1 under the conditions (27), (28), and
1 ≥ q2r2, q3r3 ≥ 0 is calculated as
b1,2max = min{b1,max, b2,max}
where
b2,max :=
µ2e
µ1
µ1(µ2 − µ1)
(s1p1 −
1
2
e−µ1p0)−
µ1e
µ2
µ2(µ2 − µ1)
(s2p2 −
1
2
e−µ2p0 − e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3).
From (27), (28),
s2p2e
µ2 − s1p1e
µ1 = (µ2 − µ1)q
1r1 + (µ22 − µ
2
1)Ω2q
2r2 + µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3q
3r3.
Since (µ22 − µ
2
1)Ω2q
2r2 ≥ 0 and µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3q
3r3 ≥ 0, we obtain b1,3U ≥ q
1r1. Hence,
b1,3U ≥ b
1,2
max, i.e., the bound b
1,2
max is better than b
1,3
U .
Wang [14] proposed that the vacuum pulse and two kinds of intensities are used
for estimating the parameters, and another intensity is used for signal pulse. In this
method, it is possible to use the counting rate and the error rate of the signal pulse.
Hence, it can be expected to improve the AKG rate by taking into account the the
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counting rate and the error rate of the signal pulse. That is, it is needed to discuss the
case of k = 3. In this case, Ma et al.’s bound q1,3L can be applied. There is a possibility
to improve existing bounds by extending Wang’s expansion (14) and (15) to the case of
k = 3. Further, as was pointed out by Ma et al.[13], we can expect that the AKG rates
are close to the upper bounds I→(µ; p0, pD, α, s) and I←(µ; p0, pD, α, s) if the number
k of intensities is sufficiently large. In the following section, we concentrate to derive
better estimates of q1 and r1q1.
5. Convex expansion of mixed state
∑∞
n=0
e−µµn
n!
|n〉〈n|
5.1. Extension of Wang’s expansion
In this section, we give a convex expansion of the phase-randomized coherent state∑∞
n=0
e−µµn
n!
|n〉〈n| as an extension of Wang’s expansion (14) and (15):
Theorem 1 Assume that µ1 < . . . < µk. Define the basis state ρi (i = 2, . . . , k + 1) as
ρi :=
1
Ωi
∞∑
n=i
γi,n
n!
|n〉〈n|,
γi,n :=
i−1∑
j=1
µn−2j∏i−1
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
Ωi :=
∞∑
n=i
γi,n
n!
.
Then, ρi is positive semi-definite, and
e−µi
∞∑
n=0
µni
n!
|n〉〈n| = e−µi
(
|0〉〈0|+ µi|1〉〈1|+
i+1∑
n=2
µ2i
n−2∏
t=1
(µi − µt)Ωnρn
)
.(30)
Note that the coefficient µ2i
∏n−2
t=1 (µi − µt)Ωn is positive.
The quantities Ω2 and Ω3 coincide with those defined in (18) and (19). Hence, we can
check that the above expansion of the case of k = 2 reproduces Wang’s expansion (14)
and (15). Further, Ω4 and Ω5 are calculated as
Ω4 =
1
µ23(µ3 − µ1)
(eµ3 − 1− µ3 −
µ23
2
−
µ33
6
)−
1
µ22(µ2 − µ1)
(eµ2 − 1− µ2 −
µ22
2
−
µ32
6
)
+
1
µ21(µ2 − µ1)
(eµ1 − 1− µ1 −
µ21
2
−
µ31
6
)
and
Ω5
=
1
µ24(µ4 − µ2)(µ4 − µ1)
(eµ4 − 1− µ4 −
µ24
2
−
µ34
6
−
µ44
24
)
−
1
µ23(µ3 − µ2)(µ3 − µ1)
(eµ3 − 1− µ3 −
µ23
2
−
µ33
6
−
µ43
24
)
General theory for decoy-state quantum key distribution 10
+
1
µ22(µ3 − µ2)(µ2 − µ1)
(eµ2 − 1− µ2 −
µ22
2
−
µ32
6
−
µ42
24
)
−
1
µ21(µ3 − µ1)(µ2 − µ1)
(eµ1 − 1− µ1 −
µ21
2
−
µ31
6
−
µ41
24
).
In order to estimate the parameters q1 and r1, we introduce new parameters
q2, . . . , qk+1, and r2, . . . , rk+1 by
qj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜n|n〉〈n| (31)
rjqj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜nr˜n|n〉〈n| (32)
for j = 2, . . . , k+1. Hence, instead of (3) and (4), as a generalization of (22), (23), (27),
and (28) we obtain the equations:
pi =
k+1∑
j=0
P ′
j
i q
j,
sipi =
k+1∑
j=1
P ′
j
i q
jrj +
1
2
P ′
0
i q
0,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, where
P ′ :=
(
1 0 0
Y Z X
)
,
and the k-dimensional vectors Y and Z and the k × k matrix X are given by
Yi := e
−µi
Zi := µie
−µi
Xji :=
{
µ2i
∏j−1
t=1 (µi − µt)e
−µiΩj+1 if j = 1, . . . , i
0 if j = i+ 1, . . . , k
for i = 1, . . . , k.
5.2. General case
In the previous subsection, we treat the case where pD = 0 and the counting rates and
the error rates of the × basis are equal to those of the + basis. Since the average state
of the state ρj with the × basis is different from that the + basis, we have to treat the
parameter qj+k of the + basis as a parameter different from the parameter qj of the ×
basis in the general setting. In this subsection, we extend the discussion of the above
subsection to the general case. Let q˜n× and r˜
n
× be the counting rate except for dark
counts in detector and error rate of the number state |n〉〈n| with the × basis, and q˜n+
and r˜n+ be those with the + basis. Instead of (31) and (32), the parameters q
2, . . . , q2k+1,
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and r2, . . . , rk+1 are introduced by
qj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜n×|n〉〈n| (33)
qj+k := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜n+|n〉〈n| (34)
rjqj := Tr ρj
∞∑
n=2
q˜n×r˜
n
×|n〉〈n| (35)
for j = 2, . . . , k + 1. That is, the upper index j has the following meaning:
j = 0: The vacuum state
j = 1: The single-photon state
j = 2, . . . , k + 1: The state ρj with the × basis
j = k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1: The state ρj−k with the × basis
Note that qj is the rate of counting except for dark counts. Instead of (33) – (35), we
have the relations
pi =
2k+1∑
j=0
P ji q
j + pD, (36)
for i = 0, . . . , 2k, and
sipi =
k+1∑
j=1
P ji q
jrj +
1
2
(P 0i q
0 + pD), (37)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. In addition, ri belongs to [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , k, and qi belongs to
[0, 1− pD] for i = 0, . . . , 2k + 1 because the dark counts occur with the probability pD.
Therefore, we can estimate of the ranges of q1 and r1 from these conditions. Here, we
defined the matrix (P ji )i=0,...,2k,j=0,...,2k+1 defined by
P :=

 1 0 0 0Y Z X 0
Y Z 0 X

 ,
where the k-dimensional vectors Y and Z and the k × k matrix X are given the above.
For examples, this matrix in the case of k = 1, 2, 3 is given as
P1 =

 1 0 0 0e−µ1 µ1e−µ1 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 0 e−µ1µ21Ω2

 ,
P2 =


1 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e
−µ2 e−µ2µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 0 0 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0
e−µ2 µ2e
−µ2 0 0 e−µ1µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3

 ,
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P3 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e
−µ2 e−µ2µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3 0 0 0 0
e−µ3 µ3e
−µ3 e−µ3µ23Ω2 e
−µ3µ23(µ3 − µ1)Ω3 ∗ 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e
−µ1 0 0 0 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e
−µ2 0 0 0 e−µ2µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3 0
e−µ3 µ3e
−µ3 0 0 0 e−µ3µ23Ω2 e
−µ3µ23(µ3 − µ1)Ω3 ∗


where
∗ = e−µ3(µ3 − µ1)(µ3 − µ2)Ω4.
6. Asymptotic key generation (AKG) rates
In this section, based on the expansion (30), we derive a lower bound of I(~p, ~s). Since the
matrix P ji has no inverse matrix, it is impossible to derive q
1 and r1 from the conditions
(36) and (37) uniquely. Then, in order to evaluate I(~p, ~s), we introduce the quantities
q1,kmin and b
1,k
max by
q1,kmin := min
~q=(q0,...,q2k+1)T
{
q1
∣∣∣∣∣ pi =
∑2k+1
j=0 P
j
i q
j + pD
1− pD ≥ q
0, . . . , q2k+1 ≥ 0
}
b1,kmax := max
~b=(b1,...,bk+1)T

b1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
sipi =
∑k+1
j=1 P
j
i b
j
+
P 0i (p0−pD)+pD
2
1− pD ≥ b
1, . . . , bk+1 ≥ 0


for i = 0, . . . , k. Then, the minimum value I(~p, ~s) can be evaluated by
q1,kmin(1− h(
b1max
q1,kmin
)) ≤ I(~p, ~s).
Thus, when µk is the signal intensity,
1
2
(
µke
−µkI(~p, ~s) + e−µk(q0 + pD)− pµkη(sµk)
)
≤ I→
1
2
(
µke
−µkI(~p, ~s) + pD − pµkη(sµk)
)
≤ I←.
In the following, we calculate b1,kmax and q
1,k
min as follows.
Theorem 2 Define the quantities qj,min, qk+j,min, and bj,max by
qj,min :=
{ ∑j
i=1 β
j
i (pi − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD))− (1− pD)µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1 if j is odd.∑j
i=1 β
j
i (pi − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)) if j is even.
(38)
qk+j,min :=
{ ∑j
i=1 β
j
i (pi+k − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD))− (1− pD)µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1 if j is odd.∑j
i=1 β
j
i (pi+k − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)) if j is even.
(39)
bj,max :=
{ ∑j
i=1 β
j
i (sipi −
1
2
(pD + e
−µi(p0 − pD))) if j is odd.∑j
i=1 β
j
i (sipi −
1
2
(pD + e
−µi(p0 − pD))) + (1− pD)µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1 if j is even.
(40)
βji := (−1)
j−1 µ1 · · ·µje
µi
µ2i
∏j
t=1,t6=i(µi − µt)
(41)
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for j ≤ k. Then, the relations
qj,min = min
~q=(q0,...,q2k+1)T
{
q1
∣∣∣∣∣ pi =
∑2k+1
j=0 P
j
i q
j + pD
1− pD ≥ q
1+j ≥ 0
}
(42)
qk+j,min = min
~q=(q0,...,q2k+1)T
{
q1
∣∣∣∣∣ pi =
∑2k+1
j=0 P
j
i q
j + pD
1− pD ≥ q
1+j+k ≥ 0
}
(43)
bj,max = max
~b=(b1,...,bk+1)T
{
b1
∣∣∣∣∣ sipi =
∑k+1
j=1 P
j
i b
j +
P 0i (p0−pD)+pD
2
1− pD ≥ b
1+j ≥ 0
}
, (44)
hold. Therefore, q1,kmin and b
1,k
max are calculated as
q1,kmin = max{q1,min, . . . , q2k,min} (45)
b1,kmax = min{b1,max, . . . , bk,max}. (46)
In order to calculate qj,min and bj,max in the channel model (6) and (7), we define
the quantity ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj):
ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) := (−1)
j−1(
j∑
i=1
βji (1− e
−αµi)− α) ≥ 0. (47)
This quantity can be characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 We denote the j − 1-dimensional simplex and its uniform probability
measure by ∆j−1 and pj−1, respectively. Then, ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) is characterized as follows.
ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj)
=
µ1 · · ·µj
(j − 1)!
∫
∆j−1
∞∑
n=0
1− (1− α)n+j+1
(n+ j + 1)(n+ j)n!
(
j∑
i=1
aiµi)
npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj (48)
= µ1 · · ·µj
∞∑
n=j+1
∑
il≥0:i1+···+ij=n−1−j
1
n!
(1− (1− α)n)µi11 · · ·µ
ij
1 . (49)
Ωj+1 is calculated as
µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1 = ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj). (50)
Using the relations (47) and (50), we can calculate qj,min, qk+j,min, and bj,max in the
channel model (6) and (7) as follows:
qj,min = qk+j,min
{
α + (p0 − pD) + ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj)− (1− p0)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
α + (p0 − pD)− ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj)− (p0 − pD)ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
bj,max =
{
sα + 1
2
(p0 − pD) + sǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) +
p0−pD
2
ǫj1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is odd.
sα + 1
2
(p0 − pD)− sǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) + (1−
1
2
(p0 + pD))ǫ
j
1(µ1, . . . , µj) if j is even.
From the expression (48), ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) is monotone increasing concerning all of
µ1, . . . , µj, and α. Also the expression (48) implies that ǫ
j
α(µ1, . . . , µj) goes to 0 when
µ1 goes to 0. That is, the upper bounds I→(µ; p0, pD, α, s) and I←(µ; p0, pD, α, s) can
be attained. This fact coincides with the fact that q˜1,2L goes to s when µ1 goes to 0,
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which was proved by Ma et al.[13]. However, in a realistic system, it is impossible to
take the limit µ1 → 0. Even if, we could realize such a small µ1, the estimation process
is not robust for statistical fluctuation. Hence, in order to attain the upper bounds
I→(µ; p0, pD, α, s) and I←(µ; p0, pD, α, s), it is suitable to fix the minimum of the width
µi − µi−1 and increase the number k.
7. Comparison of AKG rates
In order to compare estimates of q1 and q1r1, we assume that pi = pi+k. As is mentioned
in Section 4, q1,2min and b
1,2
max give the best estimates of q
1 and q1r1 among known estimates
in the case of k = 2.
In this section, we assume the channel model (6)-(8). As a typical case, we focus
on the case of a1 =0.17 dB/km, which is the lowest loss values in commercially available
optical fibres[23] a0 =5dB, θ = 0.1, p0 = 4.0× 10
−7, s = 0.03[4].
The minimum of the width µi−µi−1 is 0.1. For simplicity, we assume that our code
of classical error correction attains the Shannon rate.
Now, we compare the AKG rates with the forward error correction with exsiting
estimates. For fair comparsion, we do not take into account the dark count effect, i.e.,
assume that pD = 0. Then, we calculate the following values as functions of the distance
L:
(2) max0.2<µ2 I(µ2, q2,min(0.1, µ2), b1,max(0.1)).Ma et al.[13], Wang[14]
(3.1) max0.3<µ3 I(µ3, q
1,3
L (0.1, 0.2, µ3), b1,max(0.1)).Ma et al.[13]
(3.2) max0.3<µ3 I(µ3, q2,min(0.1, 0.2), b1,max(0.1)).Wang[14] k = 3
(3.3) max0.3<µ3 I(µ3, q
1,3
min(0.1, 0.2, µ3), b
1,3
max(0.1, 0.2, µ3)). Our result k = 3
(4) max0.4<µ4 I(µ4, q
1,4
min(0.1, 0.2, 0.3, µ4), b
1,4
max(0.1, 0.2, 0.3, µ4)). Our result k = 4
(5) max0<µ I(µ, α− p0 + pD, sα +
1
2
(p0 − pD)). Upper bound
Here, in order to treat the forward error correction case with pD = 0, we put I(µ, q
1, b1)
as I(µ, q1, b1) := 1
2
(µe−µq1(1 − h( b
1
q1
)) + e−µp0 − p(µ)h(s(µ))). In this case, we can
numerically check that q1,2min = q2,min, q
1,3
min = q2,min, q
1,4
min = q4,min, b
1,2
max = b1,max < b
1,2
U ,
b1,3max = b3,max, b
1,4
max = b3,max. Here, we treat q
1,3
L , q
1,2
L , q2,min, q
1,3
min, b1,max, b
1,2
max, b
1,3
max,
as functions of µ1, µ2, (µ3, µ4) with the model (6), (7). The transmission rates of
the abobve six cases are given in the Fig 1. The acheivable transmission length is
(2)222.8km, (3.1)215.2km, (3.2)223.2km, (3.3)224.5km, (4)224.8km, (5)225.2km. That
is, by incereasing the number k from 2 to 3 yields increasing the acheivable transmission
length increases with 1.7 km, while incereasing the number k from 3 to the infinity yields
increasing it only with 0.7 km.
Next, taking into account the dark count effect, we consider the effect of increase
of the number k of intensities with the forward and reverse error correction. In these
comparsions, it is assumed that all detections with the vacuum pulse are caused by the
dark count effect in the detector, i.e., pD = p0.
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Figure 1. The transmission rate (pD = 0): From left to right, (3.1), (2), (3.2), (3.3),
(4), (5). We cannot dintingush (4) and (5) in this graph.
In order to discuss the forward error correction case with pD = p0, we replace the
definitions of q2,min, b1,min, q
1,3
min, b
1,3
min, q
1,4
min, and b
1,4
min in the above table because these
depend on the value pD. The transmission rates of the five cases (2), (3.2), (3.3),
(4), and (5) with the forward error correction are given in the Fig 2. The acheivable
transmission length in the forward case is (2)223.0km, (3.2)223.5km, (3.3)224.5km,
(4)224.8km, (5)225.2km. That is, incereasing the number k from 2 to 3 yields increasing
the acheivable transmission length increases with 1.5 km, while incereasing the number
k from 3 to the infinity yields increasing it only with 0.7 km.
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Figure 2. The transmission rate with the forward error correction (pD = p0): From
left to right, (2), (3.2), (3.3), (4), (5)
In order to discuss the reverse error correction case with pD = p0, we replace the
definition of I(µ, q1, b1) as I(µ, q1, b1) := 1
2
(µe−µq1(1−h( b
1
q1
))+ pD− p(µ)h(s(µ))) in the
above table. The transmission rates of the five cases (2), (3.2), (3.3), (4), and (5) with the
reverse error correction are given in the Fig 3. The acheivable transmission length in the
forward case is (2)230.7km, (3.2)231.3km, (3.3)232.5km, (4)233.2km, (5)233.3km. That
is, incereasing the number k from 2 to 3, yields increasing the acheivable transmission
length increases with 1.8 km, while incereasing the number k from 3 to the infinity
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yields increasing it only with 0.8 km. These comparisions indicate that the AKG rate is
almost saturated in the case of k = 3. Further, these graphs (Figs 1, 2, and 3) show that
our AKG rate max0.3<µ3 I(µ3, q
1,3
min(0.1, 0.2, µ3), b
1,3
max(0.1, 0.2, µ3)) is better than Wang’s
proposal in the case of k = 3.
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Figure 3. The transmission rate with the reverse error correction (pD = p0): From
left to right, (2), (3.2), (3.3), (4), (5). We cannot dintingush (4) and (5) in this graph.
The optimal signal intensity with the reverse error correction is calculated as Fig
4.
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Figure 4. The optimal signal intensity with the reverse error correction (pD = p0):
From up to down, (4), (5), (3.3), (3.2), (2)
8. Proofs of Theorems
8.1. Generalization of the concept “difference”
In this section, in order to prove theorems given in above sections, we generalize the
concept of “difference”. In the conventional mean value theorem, we focus on the
difference f(x2)−f(x1)
x2−x1
between two points x1 and x2 for a given real-valued function f .
When we treat n+1 points x1, . . . , xn+1, we introduce the quantity ∆
n+1
f (x1, . . . , xn+1) :=
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i=1
f(xi)Q
1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi−xj)
as a generalization of the difference. This generalized difference
is characterized by n-th derivative by the following generalization of the mean value
theorem:
Lemma 1 Any n-differentiable function f on R and any n + 1 points x1 < . . . < xn+1
satisfy the equation:
∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1) =
1
n!
∫
∆n
f (n)(
n+1∑
i=1
aixi)pn(a1 . . . an+1)da1 . . . dan+1, (51)
where ∆n is the n-th simplex, and pn is the standard uniform probability measure on
∆n. Hence, there exists a point z ∈ [x1, xn+1] such that
f (n)(z) = n!∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1).
Its proof will be given in Appendix A. Therefore, the quantity ∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1) can be
regarded as a generalization of difference. This quantity satisfies the following recurrence
formula.
Lemma 2
∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1) =
∆nf (x2, . . . , xn+1)−∆
n
f (x1, . . . , xn)
xn+1 − x1
. (52)
Its proof will be given in Appendix B.
Using this formula, we can prove the following by induction:
∆nxk(x1, . . . , xn) =


∑
il≥0:i1+···+in=k−n+1
xi11 · · ·x
in
n if k ≥ 0
(−1)n−1
∑
il≤−1:i1+···+in=k−n+1
xi11 · · ·x
in
n if k < 0.
(53)
In particular, when 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2,
∆nxk(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, (54)
which can be also checked by Lemma 1. When k = −1, we obtain
∆n1
x
(x1, . . . , xn) =
(−1)n−1
x1 · · ·xn
. (55)
For example, when f(x) = e
x−e(1−α)x−αx
x2
, the relation (55) yields that
ǫjα(µ1, . . . , µj) = (−1)
j−1µ1 · · ·µj∆
j
f (µ1, . . . , µj). (56)
Since the j-th derivative of xn is 0 for n ≤ j − 1, the relation (56) holds for
f(x) =
∑∞
m=j+1(1− (1− α)
m)x
m−2
m!
.
Using these formulas, we obtain interesting characterization of the following two
k × k matrixes Ak and Bk:
Alk:i :=
{ ∏l−1
t=1(µi − µt) if 1 ≤ l ≤ i
0 if i+ 1 ≤ l
Bik:l :=
{
1
Ql
t=1,t 6=i(µi−µt)
if l ≥ i
0 if 1 ≤ l ≤ i− 1.
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That is,
Ak =
(
A1k A
2
k A
3
k · · · A
k
k
)
=


1 0 0 · · · 0
1 µ2 − µ1 0 · · · 0
1 µ2 − µ1
∏2
t=1(µ3 − µt) · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 µ2 − µ1
∏2
t=1(µ3 − µt) · · ·
∏k−1
t−1 (µk − µt)


Bk =


Bk:1
Bk:2
Bk:3
...
Bk:k


=


1 0 0 · · · 0
1
µ1−µ2
1
µ2−µ1
0 · · · 0
1Q3
t=1, 6=1(µ1−µt)
1Q3
t=1, 6=2(µ2−µt)
1Q3
t=1, 6=3(µ3−µt)
· · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1
Qk
t=1, 6=1(µ1−µt)
1
Qk
t=1, 6=2(µ2−µt)
1
Qk
t=1, 6=3(µ3−µt)
· · · 1Qk
t=1, 6=k(µk−µt)


,
where Aik is the i-th column vector of the matrix Ak and Bk:i is the i-th row vector of
the matrix Bk.
These matrixes play an important role in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, and are
the inverse matrixes of each other, i.e.,
k∑
i=1
Bik:lA
l′
k:i =
l∑
i=l′
∏l′−1
t=1 (µi − µt)∏l
t=1,t6=i(µi − µt)
= δl,l
′
, (57)
which is equivalent with
k∑
l=1
Bik:lA
l
k:i′ = δi,i′. (58)
The equation (57) is trivial in the case of l′ ≥ l. When l′ < l,
l∑
i=l′
∏l′−1
t=1 (µi − µt)∏l
t=1,t6=i(µi − µt)
=
l∑
i=l′
1∏l
t=l′,t6=i(µi − µt)
. (59)
Applying Lemma 1 to the case of n = l− l′ +1 and f(x) = 1, we can show that LHS of
(59) is equal to 0.
Now, we modify the matrix Ak as follows:
C lk:i :=


1
µi
if l = 1∏l−2
t=1(µi − µt) if 2 ≤ l ≤ i+ 1
0 if i+ 2 ≤ l.
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That is,
Ck =


1
µ1
1 0 0 · · · 0
1
µ2
1 µ2 − µ1 0 · · · 0
1
µ3
1 µ2 − µ1
∏2
t=1(µ3 − µt) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1
µk−1
1 µ2 − µ1
∏2
t=1(µ3 − µt) · · ·
∏k−1
t−1 (µk − µt)
1
µk
1 µ2 − µ1
∏2
t=1(µ3 − µt) · · ·
∏k−1
t−1 (µk − µt)


=
(
A0k A
1
k A
2
k A
3
k · · · A
k−1
k
)
,
where
A0k =


1
µ1
1
µ2
1
µ3
...
1
µk−1
1
µk


.
The inverse matrix C−1k is characterized as follows:
C−1k =


~0T
Bk:1
Bk:2
Bk:3
...
Bk:k−1


− (−1)k


µ1µ2 · · ·µkBk:k
−µ2µ3 · · ·µkBk:k
µ3µ4 · · ·µkBk:k
−µ4µ5 · · ·µkBk:k
...
(−1)k−1µkBk:k


. (60)
The equation (60) can be checked as follows. Using (55), we obtain
µ1µ2 · · ·µkBk:kA
0
k =
k∑
i=1
(−1)k−1
µ1 · · ·µk∏k
t=1,t6=i(µi − µt)
C1k:i = 1,
Since
Bk:i−1A
0
k =
i−1∑
l=1
1
µl
∏i−1
t=1,t6=l(µl − µt)
=
(−1)i−2
µ1µ2 · · ·µi−1
(−1)k+iµiµi+1 · · ·µkBk:kA
0
k = (−1)
k+iµiµi+1 · · ·µk
(−1)k−1
µ1 · · ·µk
,
we have
(Bk:i−1 + (−1)
k+iµiµi+1 · · ·µkBk:k)A
0
k = 0
for k ≥ i ≥ 2. Further
(Bk:i−1 + (−1)
k+iµiµi+1 · · ·µkBk:k)A
j
k = Bk:i−1A
j−1
k = δ
j
i
for k ≥ i ≥ 2, k ≥ j ≥ 2, and
−(−1)kµ1µ2 · · ·µkBk:k)A
j−1
k = 0
for k ≥ j ≥ 2. Thus, we obtain (60).
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8.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Now, we prove Theorem 1. First, we check the positivity of ρi, which is equivalent with
the positivity of γl,n for i = 2, . . . , k + 1, n ≥ 2. Substituting l − 2 and x
n−2 into n and
f(x) in Theorem 1, we have
(l − 2)!γl,n = (l − 2)!
l−1∑
j=1
µn−2j∏l−1
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
=
∫
∆l−2
(n− 2)!
(n− l)!
(
l−1∑
t=1
atµt)
n−lpl−2(a1,. . ., al−1)da1. . .dal−1 ≥ 0.
The equation (30) is equivalent with
µ2s
∞∑
n=2
µn−2s
n!
|n〉〈n| = µ2s
s+1∑
l=2
l−2∏
t=1
(µi − µt)Ωlρl
Applying (58) to the case of k = s, any function f satisfies
f(µs) =
s∑
l=1
l∑
j=1
∏l−1
t=1(µs − µt)∏l
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
f(µj).
When f(x) = xn−2 and n− 2 ≤ l − 2, f (l−1)(x) = 0. Thus, Theorem 1 yields that
l∑
j=1
1∏l
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
f(µj) = 0.
Therefore,
∞∑
n=2
µn−2s
n!
|n〉〈n| =
∞∑
n=2
s∑
l=1
l∑
j=1
∏l−1
t=1(µs − µt)∏l
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
µn−2j
n!
|n〉〈n|
=
s∑
l=1
l−1∏
t=1
(µs − µt)
∞∑
n=l+1
l∑
j=1
µn−2j
n!
∏l
t=1,t6=j(µj − µt)
|n〉〈n|
=
s∑
l=1
l−1∏
t=1
(µs − µt)
∞∑
n=l+1
γl+1,n
n!
|n〉〈n| =
s∑
l=1
l−1∏
t=1
(µi − µt)Ωl+1ρl+1,
which implies (30).
8.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Next, we prove Theorem 2. When we fix the parameter q1+j as well as q0, the parameters
q1, . . . , qj are uniquely decided only from the parameters p1, . . . , pj. That is, the relation
q˜j,min := min
~q=(q0,...,q2k+1)T
{
q1
∣∣∣∣∣ pi =
∑2k+1
j=0 P
j
i q
j + pD
1− pD ≥ q
1+j ≥ 0
}
= min
~q=(q0,...,qj+1)T

q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
pi =
∑j+1
t=0 P
j
i q
t + pD
for i = 1, . . . , j
1− pD ≥ q
1+j ≥ 0

 .
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Now, we focus on parameters q1, . . . , qj+1. Then, we have
pi − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)
=
j∑
s=1
e−µiµ2iC
s
j:iΩsq
s + e−µjµ2j
j−1∏
t=1
(µj − µt)Ωj+1q
j+1δi,j
for i = 1, . . . , j. Using (60) and (41), we have
q1 =
j∑
i=1
(C−1j )
i
1
eµi
µ2i
(
pi − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)− e
−µjµ2j
j−1∏
t=1
(µj − µt)Ωj+1q
j+1δi,j
)
=
j∑
i=1
βji
(
pi − pD − e
−µi(p0 − pD)
)
− (−1)j−1µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1q
j+1.
Note that Ωj+1 ≥ 0. Since 0 ≤ q
j+1 ≤ 1 − pD, we obtain (42). Similarly, we can prove
(43) and (40).
8.4. Proof of Theorem 3
Choose f as f(x) = e
x−e(1−α)x−αx
x2
=
∑
n=1
1
n!
(1− (1− α)n)xn−2. Using (53) and Lemma
1, we obtain
µ1 · · ·µj
∞∑
n=j+1
∑
il≥0:i1+···+ij=n−1−j
1
n!
(1− (1− α)n)µi11 · · ·µ
ij
1
= µ1 · · ·µj∆f (µ1, . . . , µj)
= µ1 · · ·µj
j∑
i=1
∑∞
n=1
1
n!
(µni − ((1− α)µi)
n)
µ2i
∏
1≤k≤j,k 6=i(µi − µk)
=
µ1 · · ·µj
(j − 1)!
∫
∆j−1
∞∑
n=0
1− (1− α)n+j+1
(n+ j + 1)(n+ j)n!
(
j∑
i=1
aiµi)
npj−1(a1 . . . aj)da1 . . . daj.
Thus, the relations (48) and (49) follow from (56).
Apply (56) to the case of f(x) =
∑∞
m=j+1
xn−2
m!
. We obtain
µ1 · · ·µjΩj+1 = µ1 · · ·µj
(
j∑
s=1
∑∞
n=j+1
µn−2s
n!∏j
t=1,t6=s(µs − µt)
)
= ǫj1(µ1, . . . , µj),
which implies (50).
9. Conclusion and further improvement
We have discussed the AKG rates with phase-randomized coherent light by the decoy
method, in which the number k of possible intensities is arbitrary. For this purpose,
by generalizing Wang’s expansion, we have derived a convex expansion of the phase-
randomized coherent state, which allows us to parameterize Eve’s operation using 3k+3
parameters even in the general case. Thanks to this parameterization, lower bound of
AKG rate has been obtained with k decoy intensities. Also, assuming that the noise in
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the quantum channel is described by a natural model, we have derived upper bounds
independent of the number k of decoy intensities as the universal upper bound. It has
been numerically demonstrated that the AKG rate is close to the universal upper bound
in the case of k = 3, i.e., the AKG rates cannot be improved so much even if we prepare
a number of intensities k larger than 3.
Further, we have discussed the intensity maximizing our upper bound of the AKG
rate. It has been shown that this optimum intensity is always less than 1. We have
also characterized the relationship between the AKG rate and intensities that do not
generate raw keys. These results indicate how to choose intensities in an implemented
quantum key distribution system, in which the decoy method is applied. Unfortunately,
this paper does not treat the security with the finite-length code. However, we will treat
this issue in the papers [24, 21], in which our expansion (30) and the matrix Pk play an
essential role.
For a further improvement of AKG rate, we can assume that some error happens in
the generator or the detector. In this case, there is a relation r1
′
= (1−pS)r
1+pS(1−r
1)
between the observed error rate r1
′
in the × basis and the error rate r1
′
out side of the
generator and the detector in the × basis, where pS is the probability that the error
in the × basis occurs at generation or detection in the single-photon state. That is,
it is suitable to substitute
b1max
q1
min
−pS
1−2pS
in side of the binary entropy h. If it is possible to
distinguish the error probabilities at generation and detection, a further improvement
is available. By taking into account bit error probability among single-photon states at
generating the pulse, a tighter evaluation of the AKG rate of the forward case may be
possible in a way similar to Renner et al.[25].
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
We will prove (51) by induction. The case of n = 1 is trivial. By the assumption of
induction, we obtain the following equations.∫
∆n−1
f (n−1)(
n∑
i=1
aixi)pn−1(a1 . . . an)da1 . . . dan = (n− 1)!
n∑
i=1
f(xi)∏
1≤j≤n,j 6=i(xi − xj)
, (A.1)
∫
∆n−1
f (n−1)(
n+1∑
i=2
aixi)pn−1(a2 . . . an+1)da2 . . . dan+1 = (n− 1)!
n+1∑
i=2
f(xi)∏
2≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
.
(A.2)
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Thus,∫
∆n−1
pn−1(a1 . . . an)f
(n−1)(
n+1∑
i=2
aixi)da2 . . . dan+1
−
∫
∆n−1
f (n−1)(
n∑
i=1
aixi)pn−1(a2 . . . an+1)da1 . . . dan
= (n− 1)!
( n∑
i=2
f(xi)(
1
xi−xn+1
− 1
xi−x1
)∏
2≤j≤n,j 6=i(xi − xj)
+
f(x1)∏
2≤j≤n(x1 − xj)
−
f(xn+1)∏
2≤j≤n,(xn+1 − xj)
)
= (n− 1)!
( n∑
i=2
f(xi)∏
2≤j≤n,j 6=i(xi − xj)
xn+1 − x1
(xi − xn+1)(xi − x1)
−
f(x1)∏
2≤j≤n(x1 − xj)
+
f(xn+1)∏
2≤j≤n,(xn+1 − xj)
)
= (n− 1)!(xn+1 − x1)
( n∑
i=2
f(xi)∏
1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
+
f(x1)∏
2≤j≤n+1(x1 − xj)
+
f(xn+1)∏
1≤j≤n,(xn+1 − xj)
)
= (n− 1)!(xn+1 − x1)
n+1∑
i=1
f(xi)∏
1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
.
Now, we introduce new parameters b = 1 − a1 or 1 − an+1 and bi =
ai
b
(i = 2, . . . , n).
Then,
(n− 1)!(xn+1 − x1)
n+1∑
i=1
f(xi)∏
1≤j≤n+1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
= (n− 1)
∫
∆n−2
∫ 1
0
f (n−1)(
n∑
i=2
bbixi + (1− b)xn+1)db b
n−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn
−(n− 1)
∫
∆n−2
∫ 1
0
f (n−1)(
n∑
i=2
bbixi + (1− b)x1)db b
n−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn
= (n− 1)
∫
∆n−2
∫ 1
0
(
f (n−1)(
n∑
i=2
bbixi + (1− b)xn+1)− f
(n−1)(
n∑
i=2
bbixi + (1− b)x1)
)
db bn−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn
= (n− 1)(xn+1 − x1)
∫
∆n−2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
f (n)(
n∑
i=2
bbixi + (1− b)(xn+1 − x1)s+ (1− b)x1)ds
db (1− b)bn−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn
=
1
n
(xn+1 − x1)
∫
∆n
f (n)(
n+1∑
i=1
cixi)pn(b1 . . . bn+1)dc1 . . . dcn+1 (A.3)
In equation (A.3), we introduce parameters c1 = (1 − b)(1 − s) ci = bbi (i = 2, . . . , n),
cn+1 = (1− b)s, and use the relation (1− b)dc1dcn+1 = dsdb. The coefficient
1
n
in (A.3)
can be checked by the relation∫
∆n−2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
dsdb(1− b)bn−2pn−2(b2 . . . bn)db2 . . . dbn =
1
n(n− 1)
.
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Therefore, we obtain (51).
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2
Since 1
(xi−x1)(xi−xn+1)
= ( 1
xi−xn+1
− 1
xi−x1
) 1
xn+1−x1
, ∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1) is calculated as
follows:
∆n+1f (x1, . . . , xn+1)
=
1
(xi − x1)(xi − xn+1)
n∑
i=2
f(xi)∏n
j=2,j 6=i(xi − xj)
+
f(x1)∏n+1
j=2 (x1 − xj)
+
f(xn+1)∏n
j=1(xn+1 − xj)
=
1
xn+1 − x1
n∑
i=2
f(xi)∏n+1
j=2,j 6=i(xi − xj)
−
1
xn+1 − x1
n∑
i=2
f(xi)∏n
j=1,j 6=i(xi − xj)
+
1
x1 − xn+1
f(x1)∏n
j=2(x1 − xj)
+
1
xn+1 − x1
f(xn+1)∏n
j=2(xn+1 − xj)
=
1
xn+1 − x1
∆nf (x2, . . . , xn+1)−
1
xn+1 − x1
∆nf (x1, . . . , xn).
Appendix C. Proof of (12) and (13)
It is sufficient to show
dI→(µ; p0, pD, pS, α, s)
dµ
|µ=1 ≤ 0 (C.1)
dI←(µ; p0, pD, pS, α, s)
dµ
|µ=1 ≤ 0. (C.2)
From the assumption, the parameter s′ also satisfies 0 ≤ s′ ≤ 1/2. Hence,
h(
s′(1−e−αµ)+ 1
2
p0
1−e−αµ+p0
) is monotone increasing concerning µ, i.e.,
dh(
s′(1−e−αµ)+ 12p0
1−e−αµ+p0
))
dµ
≥ 0. Since
dI→(µ; p0, pD, pS, α, s)
dµ
=
1
2
(
(1− µ)e−µ(α + (p0 − pD))(1− h(
sα+ 1
2
(p0 − pD)
α + (p0 − pD)
))
− e−µp0 − (1− e
−αµ + p0)
dh(
s′(1−e−αµ)+ 1
2
p0
1−e−αµ+p0
)
dµ
− e−αµh(
s′(1− e−αµ) + 1
2
p0
1− e−αµ + p0
)
)
,
dI←(µ; p0, pD, pS, α, s)
dµ
=
1
2
(
(1− µ)e−µ(α + (p0 − pD))(1− h(
sα+ 1
2
(p0 − pD)
α + (p0 − pD)
))
− (1− e−αµ + p0)
dh(
s′(1−e−αµ)+ 1
2
p0
1−e−αµ+p0
)
dµ
− e−αµh(
s′(1− e−αµ) + 1
2
p0
1− e−αµ + p0
)
)
,
we can check (C.1) and (C.2).
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